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Russia’s seamless presidential succession produced no major changes in do-
mestic politics or foreign policy. Ties with Asia remained strong, though sev-
eral key relationships—with China, Japan, and the Central Asian states—frayed 
under the impact of Russia’s military action in Georgia. Impressive economic 
performance in the fi rst half of the year boosted Russian confi dence as a great 
power, but its vulnerability to the global fi nancial crisis together with the heavy-
handed operation in the Caucasus undermined Moscow’s standing with both 
Asia and Europe by the end of the year.
Keywords: Russia, foreign policy, economic crisis, great power, Asia, energy
Tectonic economic and political shifts in 2008 led some 
observers to suggest that the fulcrum of power was shifting away from the 
Western liberal democratic world toward a new nationalistic, authoritar-
ian group of states led by Russia and China.1 Although the Sino-Russian 
partnership showed occasional strains, Washington’s neglect of Asia in an 
election year facilitated Moscow’s more active diplomacy in the Asia-
P acifi c. Politically, Russia managed a smooth transition, with Dmitry Med-
vedev succeeding Vladimir Putin as president, although the latter remained 
on the scene as a powerful prime minister who frequently overshadowed 
his young protégé. Confi dence in Russia’s great power status was shaken in 
1. This argument was voiced by Robert Kagan in The Return of History and the End of 
Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008).
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the fall of 2008 by the global fi nancial crisis, which highlighted the coun-
try’s dependence on world markets, particularly in the fi eld of energy. Rus-
sia’s military intervention in Georgia further eroded Moscow’s standing in 
the West. China, Japan, and Central Asia were troubled by Russia’s viola-
tion of Georgian sovereignty, but economic considerations muted criticism. 
A severe dip in oil prices toward the end of the year eroded the foundation 
of Russia’s success story, but the prospect of new energy deals in Asia was 
cause for some optimism.
Meet the New Boss
Russians were treated to the spectacle of a stage-managed, thoroughly pre-
dictable presidential election in the early months of 2008. President Putin 
had designated First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev as his successor in 
December, and Medvedev promised to continue Putin’s program. The pro-
presidential United Russia Party, which had garnered nearly 65% of the 
vote and 315 of 450 seats in the December 2007 Duma elections, threw its 
considerable political weight behind the young technocrat. Medvedev also 
solidifi ed his position by indicating his intention to appoint Putin as prime 
minister immediately upon taking offi ce.
The opposition, such as it was, never really had a chance. Four candi-
dates were registered for the March elections. Gennady Zyuganov once 
again represented the Communist Party; nationalist and peripatetic politi-
cal clown Vladimir Zhirinovsky was nominated by his Liberal Democratic 
Party. The fi nal candidate was an unknown former member of  United 
Russia, Andrey Bogdanov, who was reportedly backed by the Kremlin in 
a bid to split the opposition. The Central Electoral Commission rejected 
former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s attempt to secure a place on 
the ballot, declaring that his nomination petition contained invalid signa-
tures. Former world chess champion Garry Kasparov also failed to secure 
a spot, and Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the ailing Union of Right Forces 
Party, withdrew from the contest in late December.
As expected, the state-dominated mass media provided Medvedev with 
favorable coverage, while the Kremlin-sponsored group Nashi (Ours) ral-
lied the youth vote, ensuring a landslide victory for Putin’s choice, with 
just over 70% of the vote. The Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe declined to monitor the elections in the face of government ob-
struction; observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe who did attend said the vote appeared to refl ect the will of Russian 
voters, but they questioned the overall fairness of the electoral process.
Inherent in Russia’s mixed presidential-parliamentary system, patterned 
after the French model, is an uncertain division of authority between the 
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two executive positions. Medvedev asserted that he would be responsible 
for foreign policy (the Constitution assigns this power to the presidency), 
while Putin’s brief  seemed to include the economy and domestic affairs. 
However, Putin’s subsequent behavior during the Georgia crisis made it 
clear he still carried signifi cant, probably decisive, authority on foreign and 
security questions. A system of dual power (dvoevlastie) between Medvedev 
and Putin may well be untenable. Historically, divided authority in Russia 
has been a sign of weakness, as it was in 1917 (when the Petrograd Soviet 
and Provisional Government vied for control) and in 1993, when Boris Yelt-
sin used tanks to quell an insurrection by Parliament. Putin and Medvedev 
did not clash openly during the fi rst year, but the institutional framework 
makes a future contest for power diffi cult to avoid.
Nonetheless, potential confl icts between the two were not evident dur-
ing the Georgia crisis, in which Russian forces rushed to the aid of the 
South Ossetians following President Mikheil Saakashvili’s ill-considered 
decision to try to restore Tbilisi’s control over the breakaway region. Putin 
seemed to be calling the shots, with Medvedev readily acquiescing to his 
constitutional subordinate’s actions. Putin, who was in Beijing for the 
Olympics when Georgian forces started shelling Tskhinvali, the capital of 
separatist South Ossetia, fl ew to Vladikavkaz (the capital of North Osse-
tia) to direct military operations. Medvedev played his role by condemning 
Georgian aggression and accusing Saakashvili’s government of “genocide.” 
The Russian Duma, piqued by U.S. and European support for an inde-
pendent Kosovo, unanimously urged Medvedev to grant diplomatic recog-
nition to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which he did on August 26.
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy priorities appear unlikely to change 
under Medvedev—the goals of preserving great power status and exercis-
ing maximum political infl uence along the unstable southern and eastern 
borders are immensely popular with ordinary Russians and are a vital com-
ponent of offi cial Moscow’s national security program. Restoring military 
power is a priority over the next few years—Russia plans to spend $50 bil-
lion on its military in 2008 and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin announced 
in September that defense spending would increase by an additional 26% 
in 2009.
Tensions with the West may redirect Russian attention eastward, but the 
interests of major bureaucratic actors and powerful business interests (es-
pecially those in the commodities trade) are not directly affected by diplo-
matic disputes. However, of the different foreign policy factions in Russia, 
the Westernizers (those favoring close ties with the U.S. and Europe and 
supporting neoliberal economic policies) are currently the least infl uential. 
The siloviki (top offi cials in the armed forces, secret police, and power min-
istries) and Russian nationalists are in a much stronger position, which 
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suggests that relations with the U.S. and Europe will remain testy. Asia has 
been far more supportive of Russia politically and has economic potential 
equal to that of Europe’s, but Russia’s geographic position and the demo-
graphic imbalance between European Russia and the Far East constrain 
Moscow’s options in Asia.
The Best of Times?
By the time Putin left the presidency he had managed to reassert state con-
trol over the commanding heights of the economy, using a neomercantilist 
strategy similar to that pursued by China to privilege “national champions,” 
marking out an economic policy distinct from the neoliberal stance of 
Washington or London.2 From the Kremlin’s perspective, a state guided 
economy was demonstrably more stable than the Western model, which in 
the fi rst half  of  the year was plagued by the real estate crisis originating 
in the U.S. Russia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth had been a 
very respectable 8.1% in 2007, and although 2008 was expected to be some-
what lower, it was shaping up to be a very good year. Foreign exchange re-
serves stood at over $500 billion in mid-2008, oil prices reached an all-time 
high in June, and the country realized a $260 billion trade surplus in the 
fi rst half  of the year.
By late 2008, the Russian economy was in free fall. At one point in Oc-
tober, Russia’s two major stock exchanges had fallen 75% from their May 
level, and the government drew down its reserves when it allocated over 
$210 billion to bail out banks and major corporations.3 Infl ation was a 
problem, driven by high oil prices and capital infl ows, with food prices ris-
ing rapidly at an overall rate of around 15% for the fi rst half  of the year. 
In the latter half, Russia was severely impacted by the global fi nancial cri-
sis and the precipitous drop in oil prices, from a high of $147 per barrel in 
June to under $50 a barrel for Urals crude in December. Capital fl ight ac-
celerated after Putin accused the giant coal and steel fi rm Mechel of under-
paying its taxes; net outfl ows reached $33 billion in August-September, and 
the situation worsened after the Georgian confl ict.4 Few Russians seemed 
2. The idea of national champions was discussed in Putin’s 1997 dissertation on strategic 
resources. From this perspective, the most important sectors of the economy—oil and natural 
gas, other minerals, armaments, nuclear power—should be fully or partially state-owned, or 
at least under state infl uence. The most prominent national champions include Gazprom (the 
state-owned gas monopoly), Rosneft (oil), Alrosa (diamonds), Rosoboroneksport (defense), 
and Rosnanotech (State Nanotechnology Corporation).
3. Washington Post, October 24, 2008.
4. RIA (Russian News and Information Agency), Novosti, October 17, 2008.
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worried about the crisis, though, because the state-controlled media down-
played the severity of the economic downturn and focused the blame on 
the U.S.
On the positive side, Russian fi rms concluded a number of deals that 
strengthened the country’s economic position in Central Asia. In March, 
state energy giant Gazprom acquiesced to Central Asian demands for a 
better return on their natural gas, agreeing to bring payments up to world 
price levels by 2009. Under the direction of Anatoly Chubais, the state 
monopoly Unifi ed Energy Systems fi nished privatizing most of  its sub-
sidiaries, with foreign utilities assuming signifi cant shares in the new com-
panies. Moscow also moved to consolidate its hold over vital sectors of 
the economy—a new law enacted in 2008 regulated foreign investment in 
42 strategic sectors, including oil and gas, nuclear power, defense related 
industries, and mining. American-backed plans to build a natural gas pipe-
line from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India foun-
dered on an upsurge of violence in Afghanistan and uncertainty in the 
wake of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s August resignation.
Russia’s energy pipelines eastward became more important in Moscow’s 
calculations as Europeans made energy diversifi cation a priority. Work con-
tinued on the East Siberian Pacifi c Ocean (ESPO) pipeline; the fi rst sec-
tion (Taishet—Skovorodino) was scheduled to be completed by the end of 
2009. Although hugely expensive (at $14 billion), the ESPO would provide 
Russia with alternate export routes, enhancing leverage vis-à-vis the Euro-
peans. Putin traveled to the Russian Far East to promote the pipeline in 
the wake of European criticism over the Georgian confl ict, and the Rus-
sian government announced plans to increase the share of its oil exports 
to the Asian-Pacifi c region from the current 3% to 30%, with gas exports to 
grow to 15%. State pipeline monopoly Transneft had reportedly drawn up 
blueprints for the oil pipeline spur to Daqing, China, by late October. It is 
still unclear, though, whether the Siberian fi elds contain suffi cient oil to 
justify both the Pacifi c and the Daqing routes.
Russia and China continued negotiating on a natural gas pipeline, but 
the two sides differed over a pricing formula. Gazprom is trying to realize the 
same price for gas exports to Asia as it has in Europe (by tying the price to 
a basket of crude oil prices), but the Chinese have resisted. With the Euro-
peans now searching for alternatives to Russian oil and gas, the Asian mar-
kets have become more attractive. Piped gas from Russia is the most logical 
option for meeting China’s growing demand, but pipelines tie nations into 
webs of  interdependence and in any case the Chinese have resisted pay-
ing European prices. Liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) is an option, but an ex-
pensive one—Chinese demand has already driven up international prices 
for this commodity. China also wants oil and gas pipelines routed directly 
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to its territory, rather than through Mongolia or via the Russian Pacifi c 
coast.5
For China, as for Europe, Central Asian oil and gas are attractive op-
tions, given Moscow’s active political use of the energy lever. In addition, 
Central Asians may prove more interested in shipping their oil and gas east-
ward following Russia’s military action in the Caucasus, which threatens 
existing and planned pipelines to Europe. Those Central Asian societies 
with substantial numbers of Russian expatriates—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan—are now understandably nervous about Moscow’s more 
muscular approach to dealing with its neighbors. While China’s looming 
presence and the infl ow of Chinese goods and nationals cause unease 
among Central Asians, Beijing to this point has demonstrated no inclina-
tion to use force in the region.
Russia’s trade with East Asian economies continued to grow in 2008, 
while its share of  Central Asian trade lost ground to China. Russian-
Chinese trade reached a record $48.1 billion in 2007, an increase of about 
44% over the previous year. About $6.7 billion of this consisted of Rus-
sian oil exports, which were down slightly over the previous year. The real 
growth was in Chinese exports to Russia, which surged by 80% over the 
previous year. Arms sales to China declined as Beijing increasingly uti-
lized its own technology to modernize the People’s Liberation Army. Rus-
sian military equipment also came in for some bad press because of its 
poor performance in the Georgian campaign, making it less attractive to 
Asian buyers.
Russo-Japanese trade more than doubled between 2006 and 2007, grow-
ing from $9.6 billion to $20 billion.6 Energy accounted for much of this—
the Sakhalin II project ramped up its exports of crude to Japan in 2008, 
and deliveries of LNG are expected to begin in 2009. Economic coopera-
tion between Russia and South Korea continued apace. Bilateral trade was 
up sharply, at $15 billion in 2007, and a number of projects were discussed 
during President Lee Myung-bak’s September visit to Moscow. Lee pro-
posed a “New Silk Road” of Russian-Korean cooperation in energy, rail-
ways, and agriculture. The most prominent project was a huge natural gas 
deal envisioning delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually over a 
30-year period, starting in 2015, supplying about 20% of South Korean 
demand. The pipeline is to run through North Korea, assuming Pyong-
yang eventually agrees to cooperate, or the gas could be delivered in lique-
fi ed form if  a pipeline proves unfeasible.
5. John Helmer, “China Stumbles in Forging Russia Gas Deals,” Asia Times online, Janu-
ary 11, 2008, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JF11Ag01.html>.
6. Anna Smolchenko, “Fukuda to Build Ties before G8,” Moscow Times, April 25, 2008.
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The Korean gas agreement, worth an estimated $90 billion–$100 billion, 
is one indication of Gazprom’s plan to diversify exports away from Europe. 
Since the Siberian fi elds (the Kovykta fi eld north of Irkutsk and Vil yusky 
in the Sakha Republic) are far from the Pacifi c and will require expensive 
pipelines, Gazprom would prefer to supply gas from Sakhalin. But the 
company does not own ready Sakhalin 1 gas, and Sakhalin 2 gas (in which 
it does have a 50% stake) is virtually all promised in long-term contracts to 
Japanese, Korean, and American buyers.
Russia’s Far East continued to languish, victim of  Moscow’s usual 
promises for massive investments, which have never been realized in full. 
In September, Medvedev made a tour of the Far East region, attending de-
velopment conferences in Chukotka and Kamchatka, where he criticized 
local leaders for their failure to deal with problems of declining popula-
tion, unemployment, and poverty. Medvedev also stopped off  in Magadan 
to discuss the gold mining industry, where he clashed with executives de-
manding tax breaks. Stricter visa restrictions did little to moderate regional 
paranoia about Chinese migration, as tensions fl ared occasionally between 
Russian residents and Chinese students and migrant laborers.
Eurasian Leanings
In its new Foreign Policy Concept of July 2008, Russia for the fi rst time 
defi ned itself  as a Eurasian rather than European power, according to Igor 
Morgulov, Russian minister counselor to China.7 In May, Medvedev con-
fi rmed the Eurasian direction of the country’s foreign policy by making 
his fi rst offi cial visit abroad to Kazakhstan—a brief  stopover, followed by 
his primary destination, China. Medvedev’s choice refl ected the fact that 
ties with Europe and the U.S. were strained, while those with Asia were 
relatively good. Kazakhstan is the least problematic of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) countries for Moscow, and China is easily the 
most important Asian nation.
Tensions with the Bush administration, and critical comments directed 
against Russia by the American presidential candidates, particularly John 
McCain, strengthened Moscow’s resolve to signal its preference for Asian 
partners. During Medvedev’s trip to Beijing, he and President Hu Jintao 
voiced their opposition to American plans for a strategic missile defense 
shield in Europe, asserting that it would threaten the world’s strategic bal-
ance.8 The two sides also agreed on the need for a multilateral world order 
in which human rights issues were not used as a screen for interfering in 
7. Chinadaily.com, July 30, 2008, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn>. The concept can be 
found at <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>.
8. Financial Times, May 24, 2008.
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countries’ sovereign internal affairs. Russia provided assistance to China fol-
lowing the May earthquake, bringing 1,000 traumatized students to Rus-
sia for convalescence. China expressed strong support for Russia hosting 
the 2014 Olympics in the Black Sea city of Sochi, even in the wake of criti-
cism over Georgia. Shortly after Medvedev returned to Moscow, Russia 
and China celebrated the signing of a fi nal border demarcation along their 
4,300-kilometer frontier in July, capping 40 years of negotiations and fi -
nalizing an agreement reached in 2004.
Although Medvedev described China as one of Russia’s foremost part-
ners in foreign policy, China has differed with Russia in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). China would prefer to see the organiza-
tion’s economic role move to the forefront, where China is stronger than 
Russia. Moscow is understandably less enthusiastic. Russia’s military in-
tervention in Georgia also put Beijing in a diffi cult position. The Chinese 
value their partnership with Russia as a counterweight to the U.S., but Bei-
jing’s commitment to the principle of inviolable sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, given the possibility of separatism in the People’s Republic, made 
it unlikely that China would support Russian-sponsored independence for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
At the annual SCO meeting in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, China 
and the Central Asian states urged Russia and Georgia to resolve their dif-
ferences peacefully through dialogue, while preserving the unity and terri-
torial integrity of states in accord with international law. Beijing’s policy 
has sought to maintain good relations with both Moscow and Washing-
ton, so Chinese offi cials were reluctant to take sides in the confl ict. China 
was preoccupied with fl uidity along its periphery—leadership turnover in 
Pakistan, rioting in Thailand, and the selection of Taro Aso, a hawkish sup-
porter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, as Japan’s prime minister.9 Offi cials in 
Beijing were also miffed that the confl ict in the Caucasus defl ected atten-
tion from their all-out effort to showcase the 2008 Olympics.
Russia’s resort to military force in the Caucasus produced widely varying 
reactions among the country’s putative allies in the CIS. Georgia announced 
its withdrawal from the enfeebled organization. Ukraine’s leadership split, 
with President Viktor Yushenko taking a hard line against Moscow and 
lobbying for NATO membership, while Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko 
avoided criticizing Russia. Kazakhstan, which had invested heavily in Geor-
gia, refused to support Russia through the SCO and in late August launched 
a “Road to Europe” plan in connection with Kazakhstan’s 2010 chairman-
ship of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
9. Yu Bin, “China Still On-side with Russia,” Asia Times online, September 6, 2008, <http://
www.atimes.com>.
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(OECD).10 Azerbaijan recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity and wel-
comed Georgian refugees, but the vulnerability of the country’s oil and 
gas export routes, illustrated by British Petroleum’s decision to shut down 
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline temporarily, may force Baku to work more 
closely with Moscow. The energy producing states of Central Asia, by con-
trast, may fi nd greater security in shipping their product eastward to China.
Japan and Russia continued to discuss the perennial issue of the dis-
puted Northern Territories (Kurile Islands), though Medvedev showed no 
sign of being more accommodative on the issue than was Putin. During 
Prime Minster Fukuda Yasuo’s April visit to Moscow, a joint venture was 
announced between the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metal National Corporation 
(JOGMEC) and Irkutsk Oil to explore for oil in East Siberia.11 Japan of-
fered its support in developing the Russian Far East, though Tokyo was 
unhappy with Moscow’s plans to invest in the Northern Territories, thus 
making it more attractive for the Russian inhabitants to stay.
The Japanese sided with the other G-8 countries in condemning Russia’s 
military action in Georgia, including Moscow’s diplomatic recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.12 Tokyo immediately pledged up to $1 million 
in emergency humanitarian assistance to Georgia and postponed planned 
naval exercises with Russia. Japan’s Ministry of Defense warned in its 2008 
White Paper that Russia had reemerged as a strong state and was develop-
ing a military posture in the Far East commensurate with its new economic 
potential.13 For Japan, a confi dent Russia that is more confrontational to-
ward the U.S. underlines the importance of the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance, 
and may have encouraged the recent warming in Japan’s ties with China.
Russian-Korean relations revolved around the Six-Party Talks on North 
Korea’s denuclearization (stalled after Pyongyang announced its intention 
to restart its program, in violation of the 2007 agreement), as well as busi-
ness deals on energy, automobiles, and aerospace. President Lee Myung-
bak visited Moscow for a summit with Medvedev and Putin in September 
2008, where the two sides announced that their relationship had been up-
graded to a strategic partnership. Lee pointedly refrained from criticizing 
10. Andrew Iacobucci, “Kazakhstan: Astana Promotes Plan for Expanded Ties with Eu-
rope,” Eurasianet.org (October 23, 2008), <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/
articles/eav102308.shtml>.
11. Bruce Gale, “Russia and Japan Paper over Their Differences,” Straits Times (Singa-
pore), May 14, 2008.
12. Joseph Ferguson, “Russia Disappointed in Dushanbe,” Japan Times, September 15, 
2008.
13. Japan Ministry of Defense White Paper, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/ 
2008/part1/Chap1.pdf>.
144 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2009
Moscow over Georgia; indeed, in a clear rebuke to Washington’s confron-
tational warnings, the Korean side expressed its support for Russian mem-
bership in the World Trade Organization and for Russia’s plans to host the 
2012 Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation forum and the 2014 Olympics. 
Lee and Medvedev also agreed to push North Korea to cooperate on com-
pleting the Trans-Korea Railroad link.
Under pressure from the U.S. and its G-8 colleagues, Russia countered by 
convening the fi rst independent ministerial meeting of the BRIC emerging-
market countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) in Ekaterinburg in July, 
followed by a G-8 sideline meeting among the four heads of state, in Hok-
kaido. Russian leaders fi nd the idea of a BRIC grouping appealing as a 
counterweight to U.S. and NATO dominance and, perhaps more impor-
tant, as a dynamic economic grouping shifting the balance of power away 
from the West. The four nations have common interests in strengthening 
multilateralism and combating terrorism and drug traffi cking, and there 
are clear complementarities among their economies. Although the July 
meeting of foreign ministers seemed in accord on the question of contain-
ing separatism (in the context of Serbia and Kosovo), Russia’s military ac-
tion in Georgia was bound to strain ties among the new partners.
Relations with India warmed as Moscow courted the Asian giant through 
the BRIC forum and in bilateral talks. During Medvedev’s December visit 
to New Delhi, the two sides discussed cooperation in nuclear power, space 
exploration, and weapons sales. The Russian president received a warm 
reception but cut short his visit upon learning of the death of Orthodox 
Patriarch Alexei II. Russia has actively courted India diplomatically and 
economically, hoping to contain gains in U.S.-Indian relations made in re-
cent years by the Bush administration. India, in turn, continues its efforts 
to expand trade and acquire upstream energy assets in Russia and Eur-
asia. In August, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) bid 
against China’s Sinopec for control of Imperial Energy Corporation, of-
fering $2.6 billion. Imperial Energy, an oil and gas exploration and pro-
duction company founded in 2004 and based in England, holds modest 
hydrocarbon reserves in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Few Russian initiatives were evident in Southeast Asia in 2008. Indone-
sia took delivery of three Su-30 jet fi ghters and three Mi-17 helicopters, 
with an additional three Su-27s to follow in 2009, but cancelled talks for 
the purchase of Russian submarines.
Toward the end of 2007, Russia committed $500,000 for the ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-Russia Dialogue Partnership 
Fund for energy, trade, and Russian language promotion projects. Russian 
fi rms Rusal and Gazprom concluded agreements with Vietnam in the 
aluminum and oil sectors. Russia and the U.S. clashed over the proposed 
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extradition of Viktor Bout, a former Russian military offi cer suspected of 
illegal arms trading who was arrested in Bangkok in March 2008, putting 
Thailand in a diffi cult position. The Asian Development Bank in Septem-
ber approved a $40 million loan to Georgia at the lowest possible rate, sig-
naling Asian displeasure with Russia’s action in the Caucasus.14
Conclusion
Russia started the year fl ush with oil money, with a rapidly expanding 
economy, and confi dent that its position as a great power was fi rming up 
nicely. Stage-managed presidential elections produced a smooth transition 
from Putin to Medvedev, with the ex-KGB offi cer staying on to ensure 
that the gains of  the past eight years would not be lost. Strong central 
authority was further guaranteed by the political stranglehold of United 
Russia, the pro-presidential party that dominated the Duma and controlled 
the bulk of Russia’s governorships. Ties with the U.S. and much of Europe 
were strained, but relations with Asia showed great promise.
By the end of the year, the situation looked considerably bleaker. The 
precipitous decline in oil and gas prices, and Putin’s intemperate criticism 
of Russian business, coupled with the occupation of Georgia, contributed 
to the collapse of the Russian stock markets, proving that Russia could 
not shield itself  from upheavals in the global economy. Asian criticism of 
Russia’s military action in the Caucasus may have been muted, but there 
were clearly fears in many quarters that Soviet-style aggression was back 
in fashion. Russia’s authoritarian trends may not have preoccupied Asians 
to the same extent as Europeans, but neither did they provide a workable 
basis for an axis of authoritarian states led by Russia and China.
14. Keith Bradsher, “Asians Rebuke Russia with Loan for Georgia,” International Herald 
Tribune, September 13, 2008.
